The Cost Of Sycophant Syndrome On Organizational Health

What can leaders do about this syndrome?

In the fields of organizational behavior and leadership, the focus is often on the business environment or corporate structure; however, lessons can also be learned from the composition of larger systems, such as a national government. The macro-structure can provide insights for the micro-structure and vice versa. In this article, we address the issue of “sycophant syndrome” and the systemic stifling of disruptive thought and innovative ideas. As an example, we will look at the government of Vladimir Putin, who has been President of Russia since 2000 and is hoping to extend his grip on power to, at least, 2036. This would make him the longest reigning leader of Russia or the Soviet Union, longer than Joseph Stalin, Catherine the Great or Peter the Great. 

In particular, we will use Putin’s “vertical of power” as a way in which to discuss this sycophant syndrome that can also be found in many American boardrooms, university campuses and organizations across various industries and sectors, in order to highlight the negative consequences of a structure that demands loyalty and compliance over innovation.

Bency Joy has argued in his recent article, “Working Climate and Sycophantic Behaviour of Employees,” that sycophants waiting to find a role are rife in organizations. “They are prepared to overlook anything shady, illegal or unethical as long as they are getting to hang around and share some power.” These individuals spoil the work environment and diminish the enthusiasm level, which become a drain on productivity.  “An organization which is under the clutches of sycophants will never be able to do innovative and novel activities; rather will always be involved in the routine works only.” 

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian capitalism and democracy emerged out of a very chaotic transition to the market economy. Banditry, corruption and protection rackets functioned at the lower levels of society and at the higher levels, a class of businessmen, the Oligarchs, emerged buying national industries for pennies on the dollar. The Oligarchs soon also had a controlling hand within the Kremlin. When Putin replaced Boris Yeltsin as President, the economy was in shambles, the political system was nonfunctioning and the population had lost its moral compass and social structures. Undoubtedly, there was a demand to restore a centralized state apparatus that would bring law and order to what had become an uncivilized society. Putin’s response was to (re)establish the vertical of power that served the immediate purpose of rapidly reorganizing the government, but this has had negative organizational results over time, suffering from sycophant syndrome.

In a recent article, the author explored the cost of toxic leaders on an organization. Toxic behaviors in the workplace can also have numerous negative organizational impacts. A corollary can also be the cost of “yes-men” or sycophants on the organization. Merriam-Webster defines a sycophant as “a servile self-seeking flatterer” and the Cambridge Dictionary defines it as “someone who praises powerful or rich people in a way that is not sincere, usually in order to get some advantage from them”; synonyms include parasite, bootlicker, brownnoser, fawner, flunky, suck-up, toady. 

So why is sycophancy syndrome so common within organizations? What are its impacts? What can organizational leaders do about it?

Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy have provided the definitive book on Vladimir Putin. Within their analysis of the Putin government, they pay specific attention to the introduction of the vertical of power which was a return to a top-down command structure that imitated Soviet centralization. During his first presidency, Putin created seven super federal regions, undermining the local governors, who had gained limited power during the collapse of the Soviet Union. In establishing these seven federal regions and populating them with loyal individuals, the Kremlin gained political power over regional entities. During his second term, Putin tightening his grip by making United Russia the only political party with real access to the Kremlin. By 2008, Putin had appointed most of the 825 top positions in the government and 80% of regional governors belonged to the United Russia political party.

At the same time, in order to adhere to the Russian constitution, Putin stepped down to the position of Prime Minister so that Dmitrii Medvedev, Putin’s long-time friend and former Prime Minister, could be elected President. Was this election and the resulting “tandem” government the most obvious example of obsequiousness in the name of political order? Soon after, however, the vertical of power proved to be ineffectual in dealing with real problems. When closing a cement factory led to riots and when wildfires raged in the summer of 2010, regional officials were too afraid to make decisions without the Kremlin’s direct consent. This meant that Putin had to personally deal with these regional problems because he had surrounded himself with sycophants. Even worse, in this top-down system, the proximity to Putin was the real measure of power, not the official title. It became risky to make a decision unless Putin or someone close to Putin agreed. As Hill and Gaddy note, ““The old Soviet and Russian establishment has been replaced by the ultimate old boy network – a one-boy network – where Vladimir Putin functions as the primary recruiter” (219). 
 
This structure worked well for Putin when he needed to solidify his political power over Russia, however, he had become organizationally constrained by not evolving the administrative model as Russia itself evolved. In fact, by 2010, it was clear that senior officials were not following the orders of President Medvedev or of Prime Minister Putin because the vertical of power was ineffective. Andrew Monaghan has noted the logical problems of this system: bureaucratic rivalries and blurred lines of responsibilities between ministries, along with systematic corruption and incompetence were realities of this obsequiousness (10). As a result, Putin was forced several times to adopt a method called “manual control” in order to overcome these rivalries, corruption and incompetence. Monaghan writes: “Manual control means that the executive leadership has to micromanage even day-to-day matters, and is obliged to assume the responsibilities of lower-level officials.” Ministers and governors would not act until Putin himself made a decision while mayors and district heads waited for instructions from the governors. Sectors of Russia came to a standstill. No one had been empowered to do their job. They had been coerced and coopted into an organizational structure that distrusted innovation and disliked disruption.

In 2012, Putin returned to the post of President in what was called a “castling move” (known in chess when the King and Rook exchange positions). It was believed that part of the reason that Medvedev exchanged places was because the vertical of power needed Putin in the position of President.

In her recent CNN article, “The Psychology of Sycophancy,” Susan Scutti examines sycophants who glom onto powerful politicians. She quotes Brad J. Bushman, a professor of communication and psychology at The Ohio State University, who says, “[S]ome people would rather have a boost in self-esteem than get money or eat their favorite food or see their favorite friends. They just can't stop seeking praise. It has this addictive quality.”

Max McKeown further argues in his article, “Psycopaths & Sycophants,” that often organizational leaders display the characteristics of narcissists and psychopaths. Their closest, most loyal followers are often sycophants. He states, “Far too many organisations are stuffed with sycophants prepared to overlook anything shady, illegal, or unethical as long as they are getting to hang around and share some power. Even if that means pandering to a corporate psychopath.”

In relation to the impact of workplace politics and sycophancy, in his recent article, “How to Tackle Workplace Politics and Sycophancy,” Saurebh Gandle argues that there is an “assumption by other employees that one person is getting undue attention and advantage owing to closeness with the boss. The new joiners or those introverts who would think their work should do the talking would also become dissatisfied by this approach of some employees trying to develop closeness with the employer.”

We tend to take sycophancy for granted, as an inevitable condition of the workplace. However, does it need to be that way? How do we effectively deal with and counteract the behavior of workplace sycophants?

Hire the right people: From creating the job posting, to implementing the applicant screening and interviewing process, organizational leaders and hiring managers need to pay special attention to this sycophant phenomenon. They need to strive for promoting diversity and inclusivity in the hiring process, which includes diversity of thought and the willingness to express those thoughts to a manager. As a former KGB agent, Putin has mainly populated his government with those, like himself, who have come from the security services.

Promote the right people: The Peter Principle is alive and well (people are often promoted to their level of incompetence) and just because someone was successful in their last role does not mean they will be successful in the new role, particularly if that means they will be leading people for the first time. When promoting individuals, ensure that they have both the background and the necessary skillset required for the new position. Avoid the common tendency to simply promote those who have been “most loyal” or do not rock-the-boat. These are clear warning signs of sycophants (either in embryo or in full bloom). As a further example, senior officials in the Russian government have often been redeployed or even promoted after proving to be incompetent (Monaghan 11).

Surround yourself with diverse thinkers: If you find yourself in a leadership role, your first task is to make sure that you are surrounded by competent individuals with diverse backgrounds and ways of thinking about the world. If you only surround yourself with those loyal to you, you will get yes-men and sycophants who will only tell you what they think you want to hear. Rather, surround yourself with those who will constructively challenge you, play devil’s advocate, and push back on both strategy and implementation. There has been little turnover among Putin’s cabinet and ministers over his twenty-years in political power. 

Create a healthy culture that promotes discussion and debate: Sycophant syndrome is pervasive in organizations and teams where outside-the-box thinking and failure is punished, where the challenging of the leader’s authority is either implicitly or explicitly discouraged, and where those who with different points of view are not able or willing to share their thinking. Leaders need to create and maintain a healthy, sustainable culture where everyone feels safe to dissent, where everyone feels genuinely needed, wanted, and valued, regardless of the extent to which they agree with the leader. Debate is possible in Putin’s government, but once he has made a decision, there is no room for an on-going discussion. 

Get rid of the sycophants: Finally, get rid of the sycophants and the leaders who thrive on them. Over the years, Putin’s Cadre, which is made-up of childhood friends and trusted individuals from his years in Dresden as a KGB agent and in St Petersburg as Deputy Mayor, has been entrusted to oversee key industries in oil, gas and transportation. This is the basis for what Karen Dawisha has called Putin’s kleptocracy.  

As a result of the vertical of power, there are no logical political successors who can be trusted to replace Putin. Political challengers who cannot participate in this system might choose to destroy Putin politically and all that he has created because the vertical is, in fact, contingent on Putin remaining in power – possibly forever, with many long-term, negative effects for Russia. 

Similarly, organizations of all types often fall victim to sycophant syndrome and its impacts. Leaders need to actively battle this tendency in order to ensure the long-term sustainable health of their organizations.