The Supreme Court recently held a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII against Goodyear Tire Company.  It was time-barred because it did not contain allegations of discrete discriminatory acts within 180 days of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint.

Lilley Ledbetter was employed by Goodyear for 19 years, until 1998. As an area manager, her salary was not increased at a comparable rate of her male counterparts' salaries over the period of her employment. Ledbetter alleged in her EEOC complaint that Goodyear had paid her in a discriminatory manner due to the fact that she was a woman - arguing that each paycheck was a separate act of discrimination.

The Court determined that a valid Title VII claim requires an act of discrimination, such as termination, failure to promote, refusal to hire or denial of transfer. Individual paychecks do not qualify as discrete acts of discrimination, but pay decisions do. Noting that the EEOC filing deadline 'protect[s] employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past,' the Court ruled that the "EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes place. A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent non-discriminatory acts that entail adverse affects resulting from the past discrimination.

While the decision does not condone unequal pay or other discriminatory acts, the Court recognized that the necessary intent to discriminate was missing during the statutory 180 day limitation period in Ledbetter's claim.